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of options, each targeting different aspects as it evolves over time and space. We develop
a 2-region bioeconomic model that includes several transmission pathways that spread the
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practices, including habitat restoration and less damaging production activities, are avail-
able to the regulator. We investigate the implications of different transmission pathways and
second-best policies on the control patterns and invasive populations. Second-best settings
where certain controls are not available to the regulator result in large distortions on the opti-
mal use of the land. Overall, we find that non-linear interactions between regions, pathways,
and controls are significant determinants of the optimal management of invasive species.
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1 Introduction
The ecological and economic damages of invasive species (denoted IAS) are gaining
increasing attention in the scientific, conservation and policy arenas both domestically and
internationally. The range of policy choices for addressing IAS includes reducing trade-
related introductions through inspections and trade policy; curtailing establishment and
spread through habitat management; controlling or eliminating existing infestations by
removal efforts; mitigating damages by adapting management to levels of the IAS; and sac-
rificing native species and habitat to the IAS. To explore the complex interactions amongst
IAS policies and amongst the numerous IAS transmission pathways, the paper develops and
analyzes a two region bioeconomic model.
The economic literature on IAS has primarily focused on the temporal aspects of IAS
control using only one or at most two of the potential policy options (Eiswerth and Kooten
2002; Horan et al. 2002; Leung et al. 2002; Olson and Roy 2005, 2008; Olson 2006; Mehta
et al. 2007). Several papers focus on trade as a vector of introduction and invasion, including
emphases on tariffs, inspections, and protectionism (McAusland and Costello 2004; Margolis
et al. 2005; Costello et al. 2007). The ecological literature and some of the economics IAS lit-
erature examines ecological dispersal and invasion mechanisms (Finnoff et al. 2005; Davies
and Sheley 2007).
Surprisingly, the impact of spatial aspects of IAS ecology and economics on optimal pol-
icies has not received as much attention in the economics literature. Indeed, several of the
non-spatial papers on IAS and a literature review article discuss the need for examination of
the effect of heterogeneity and spatial linkages on policy choice and effectiveness (Kaiser
and Roumasset 2002; Leung et al. 2002; Olson 2006). Some noteworthy exceptions to the
non-spatial approach include papers that emphasize agricultural pest damages over distance,
barrier zones, species migration, spatial coordination, and wildlife disease (Hof 1998; Sharov
and Liebhold 1998a,b; Sharov 2004; Horan et al. 2005; Skonhoft and Olaussen 2005; Carter
et al. 2006; Wainger and King 2006).
Building off of the spatial literature, our 2-region model with IAS introductions and dis-
persal allows us to investigate the tradeoffs amongst a wide-range of controls. Because we
explicitly incorporate two regions, several controls, and several transmission pathways, we
are limited to focusing on the steady-state of the system. We use this framework to explore
the interactions between multiple IAS transmission and dispersal pathways and to investi-
gate the difference in policy recommendations from analysis that considers only a limited
portfolio of control options (second-best scenario) to the case when all controls are available
(first-best scenario).
Our comprehensive modeling framework includes the following components. First, there
are three types of invasion and dispersal mechanisms: two related to economic activities
that form transmission vectors and one ecological mechanism, where the species disperses
from one region to the other. One type of “economic” transmission is represented by the
flow of goods (e.g., imports) into the two regions (denoted foreign trade). This transmission
pathway represents the IAS coming from outside the system and we account for the fact that
greater levels of imports increases the extent of the invasion, and the other captures an inter-
regional commerce or “domestic” trade pathway between the regions.1 In addition, once the
1 To be clear, the foreign and domestic trade labels are more of a mnemonic than they are meant to convey
our modeling of the complex economic interactions within and between countries. That is, we do not develop
a computable general equilibrium model to investigate invasive species control, which is an interesting area
for future research.
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invasive species is established in one of the regions it can spread by an ecological dispersal
processes.
Second, we link the transmission processes with the population biology of the species
in each region where the dynamics depend on the quality of habitat in the region. Because
the IAS engineers the stock of habitat (e.g., damages the habitat to make it more favorable
for its survival), the greater the level of the infestation, the lower is the stock of habitat.
The set of “ecosystem engineers”—species that modify, maintain, and create habitat often
to their competitive advantage (Jones et al. 1994; Hastings et al. 2007)—includes beavers,
Kudzu, zebra mussels, and cheatgrass. The damages from the IAS, therefore, are not only
the lost grazing opportunities or clogged pipes but also the concomitant effects to the func-
tioning of the ecosystem after their establishment. Because degraded habitats are more likely
to be invaded (Huenneke et al. 1990; Cohen and Carlton 1998; Gordon 1998; Enserink
1999; Cumming 2002), the extent of transmission into a region from the trade or eco-
logical dispersal vector is also a decreasing function of the quality of the habitat in the
region. Both of these negative feedbacks result in faster growth rates of the invasive spe-
cies.
Third, we model explicitly the ecological mechanisms that lead to economic damages,
which in our stylized setting are the reduction in profits from commodity production
(e.g., agriculture, grazing) less the costs of inspections, removal, and restoration efforts.
In each region, commodity production is an increasing function of the quality of the habitat
and we include the possibility of the use of a non-habitat input that can substitute for the
habitat. By degrading the quality of the habitat, the invasive species reduces the value of the
commodity production. We also account for the fact that excessive levels of the non-habitat
input can also degrade the natural habitat that will in turn lead to greater infestation rates and
further damages.
Overall, our framework permits us to highlight the trade-offs for a benevolent social plan-
ner that is considering simultaneously the prevention and treatment activities of IAS control
across two regions. Prevention is accomplished through the use of inspections to reduce
transmission both from outside and within the system and through more sustainable com-
modity production as a means to reduce the likelihood of the habitat being invaded. Treatment
activities include direct removal efforts (e.g., weeding or pesticide application) that result
in lower infestation levels and restoration activities that are investments in improving the
quality of the habitat.
Our numerical analysis demonstrates that, when there are multiple pathways for IAS
transmission, control strategies are not straightforward additive or average combinations
of the results with a limited set of pathways because system-wide interactions are non-
linear. We develop the general 2-region model but then focus the analysis on the case of
a port-inland regional structure both for ease of exposition and to represent spatial het-
erogeneity in our base case. Our results signal that policy recommendations from model-
ing efforts that only consider a subset of the dimensions and/or control strategies may be
far from economically efficient and can lead to excessive ecological damages or abandon-
ment of production activities. Similarly, we find that control strategies in the presence of
spatially linked processes (IAS transmission) interact in a non-linear way with the degree
of spatial heterogeneity. The implication is that conclusions from models that use prox-
ies of spatial processes based on spatial heterogeneity (e.g., existence of a type of habitat)
can make erroneous predictions for which even the direction of error is difficult to deter-
mine.
In the next section, we present the stylized bioeconomic metapopulation model and social
planner’s objective function. Subsequently, we investigate numerically the role of the dif-
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ferent transmission pathways relative to the base case of no pathways in a homogeneous
economic and ecological system in order to isolate the effects of different spatial processes.
We then introduce heterogeneity into the system to focus on the interaction of spatial linkages
and heterogeneity. Finally, we conclude with an analysis of the implications of restricting
the control set available to a planner in the presence of all pathways.
2 Two-Region Bioeconomic Model
Our bioeconomic model consists of two regions of heterogeneous habitat that are linked by
trade and ecological transmission pathways. The social planner’s (SP) problem is to maxi-
mize the return from commodity profits less the costs of treatment and prevention. Within
each region, the production of the commodity can affect the rate at which invasions occur
and the ecological growth rate of the IAS. The SP can undertake IAS removal efforts and/or
can perform restoration activities that, by improving the quality of the habitat, slow the rate
of IAS arrival and growth. Habitat quality is, however, assumed to be depleted based on the
production of the commodity and damages due to the level of the IAS. In any period, the
social planner makes the following policy choices: the level of inspections on domestic and
foreign trade in each region, the amount of restoration to improve the habitat per region, the
amount of IAS removal per region and the amount of the non-habitat input to apply in each
region.
2.1 Ecological Model
The change over time in the amount of the IAS in each region relies on three compo-
nents: invasion through trade and ecological dispersal, growth, and removal activities. Let
the instantaneous rate of change of biomass (x) of an IAS in region i be equal to Eq. 1
where f (xi , x j , Hi , Vi , IVi , ISi , Si ) is the biological production function in each period of
the invasive species in region i , including ecological dispersal from the biomass in region
j and net additions from trade (these variables will be described in greater detail below);
R(xi , Ei ) is the removal production function in each period:
dxi/dt = f (xi , x j , Hi , Vi , IVi , ISi , Si ) − R(xi , Ei ) (1)
Before elaborating on the components in Eq. 1, we describe the equation of motion for Hi ,
a measure of ecosystem health of the habitat. Here, habitat health is a natural capital stock
that can be depleted by production and invasion and replenished with restoration efforts.
Equation 2 describes the instantaneous rate of change of the habitat, where g(Hi , mi ) is the
regenerative capacity function of the habitat, which can be supplemented by restoration/miti-
gation efforts (mi ), and D(Ai,xi ) is destruction or alteration of the habitat as a function of the
level of the IAS (xi ) and the use of inputs for commodity production in region i(Ai ). A simple
formulation that captures the separate and increasing impact of commodity production and
IAS levels is:
















where ψi is the intrinsic (natural) recovery rate of the habitat, Hmi is the natural (pristine)
condition of the habitat, Ai is the level of the non-habitat inputs in area i, δi,1 is the rate of
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damage to the habitat from the use of the non-natural input in the production of the commod-
ity, δi,2 is the rate of habitat damage due to the invasive population within region i , and mi
is the restoration rate. Both mi and Ai are choice variables. Here, restoration augments the
natural growth rate of the habitat, and the returns to investing in restoration decrease with
the quality of the habitat stock.
2.1.1 IAS Biological Production Function
We modify the standard logistic population growth model to account for ecological dispersal,
transmission through trade, and the potential role of habitat quality in reducing the growth of
the invasive. Similar to the logistic model, the growth of the population is a function of the
standing stock of the population. That is, the basis of our population model in each region is
ai xi (1 − xi/ki ), where ai is the growth rate and ki is the carrying capacity. To account for
ecological dispersal, we expand the growth term (ai xi ) to include the possibility that indi-
viduals dispersing from the other region can contribute to growth in region i in any period.
With this addition, we have (ai xi +bi x j ) (1− xi/ki ) where b j is the ecological dispersal rate
for species moving from region j to i. This formulation was used to investigate the effects of
marine reserve creation on economic efficiency (Sanchirico et al. 2006). Ecological dispersal
between regions means that the IAS growth in one region is a function of the level of the IAS
in the other region and ecological connectivity can allow invasion without a trade vector.
Two other sources of the IAS that can contribute to its population growth in any period are
individuals piggybacking on either the movement of economic goods and services between
the regions (denoted domestic trade) and the movement of goods and services from outside
the two regions (denoted foreign trade). For example, many invasive grasses attach to cattle
hides, cars, feedstocks (e.g., hay), and agricultural products, which are then moved between
regions. Cocoons of the gypsy moth can attach to lawn equipment that is then moved between
regions. The same type of process occurs with goods and services coming from outside the
region. In both cases, inspections of these goods and services can control this movement.
California, for example, inspects household goods for the cocoons of gypsy moths when
individuals move into the state.
We model the effects of domestic and foreign trade transmission pathways on the growth of
the invasive species by including two additional terms in the growth portion of the population
dynamics. With these additions, we have (ai xi + bi x j + β1,i G(Si , Is, x j ) + β2,i F(Vi , Iv))
(1 − xi/ki ) where β1,i and β2,i are the rates of growth due to the introduction from domestic
trade G(·), and foreign trade F(·), respectively. Specifically, these functions are
F(Vi , IVi ) =
(
Vi
1 + i IVi
)
and G(Si , ISi , x j ) =
(
Si x j
1 + ωi ISi
)
(3)
where (i , ωi ) are scaling parameters.
Under these assumptions, transmission of the IAS through the trade vector increases with
the volume of imports to region i from foreign trade (Vi ) and from within the system or
domestic trade (Si ), and decreases with the level of inspections on foreign and domestic
imports (IVi , ISi respectively). Population increases through domestic trade pathways also
depend on the level of the invasive in the origin of the imports, where the spread term in
region i increases with the extent of invasion in region j (x j ). Because IAS transmission
through foreign goods is exogenous, eradication of the invasive population is only possible
if inspections can drop the level of those incoming populations to zero. By assumption, F(·)
can significantly reduce the level of incoming populations, but that level cannot be driven to
zero unless the level of Vi is zero.
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An additional component of the biological production function captures the role of habitat.
Although eventually, without any removal efforts, the invasive species will reach its carrying
capacity, the quality of the habitat can act to reduce the rate of growth of the invasive species.
To account for the effects that habitats have on decisions regarding removal, we include the
role of habitat in a multiplicatively separable fashion.
The final piece of Eq. 1 is the possible reduction of the IAS population through removal.
We assume that the amount of infestation removed is likely to be an increasing function of
effort, and it is likely to be an increasing function of the current state of invasion (making
total eradication difficult). Therefore, removal activity is R(xi , Ei ) = qi Ei xi , where qi is the
efficiency of a unit of control effort (Ei ) on reducing the population of the invasive species.

























































where ρ < 1 captures the effect of the species on habitat quality and, in turn, this degradation
encourages the growth of the species.
While Eq. 4 is complex, it captures three ways for an invasive species to invade a region.
On the economic side, the invasive can enter through both domestic and foreign trade as in
the “introduction” term. On the ecological side, the ecological dispersal term identifies how
the species moves between regions. The equilibrium of Eq. 4 without any removal effort
occurs when the invasive population is equal to its carrying capacity.
2.2 Economic Model
The ecological model links to a spatial economic model that has three “sectors” in two regions
(see Fig. 1). Both the import sector, represented by Vi , and the inter-regional trade sector, rep-
resented by Si , contribute benefits but also create IAS transmission pathways. Each region’s
commodity production also generates value as a function of habitat quality and the IAS level
but that production also degrades habitat quality. For this paper, trade levels are exogenously
determined, which implies that inspection costs have a negligible effect on trade volume, and
trade-restrictive policy is not utilized.2
Because trade flows are fixed, the relevant metric for the change in net benefits from trade
is the direct cost of inspections, . We assume that these costs are linear in the inspections or
2 This assumption has little impact on the ecological side of the model because the key parameters(i , ωi )
could easily represent either success at preventing invasion or at reducing trade. However, on the economics
side, the assumption of fixed trade volumes matters because trade volumes may well be sensitive to inspection
costs and because interactions across trade sectors and domestic production can produce ambiguous effects
on the IAS (Costello and McAusland 2003). We leave these issues for future research. However, our model is
sufficient to illustrate the potential implications of including a more realistic trade sector.
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 = θSi ISi + θS j IS j + θVi IVi + θVj IVj , where the inspections are measured in terms of the
volume of trade coming in that are inspected. θ ′s are the unit costs of doing the inspections
of the shipments arriving into region i via domestic trade S or foreign trade V .
We model commodity production that is susceptible to damages from IAS through
degraded habitat quality. Profits in each region are equal to the differences between total
revenues from commodity production, pi Qi (Ai , Hi ), where pi is the output price in region
i , less costs (Ci (Ai , Ei,mi )) of input use and the additional controls on the IAS, includ-
ing habitat restoration and IAS removal efforts; πi = pi Qi (Ai , Hi ) − Ci (mi , Ai , Ei ). By
assuming that the price of output is not sensitive to changes in the level of the commodity
produced, we are considering a situation where the regions are small producers on the world
market, which is consistent with our treatment of the “trade” sectors.
The commodity production function has the following properties: Qi (Ai , 0) > 0 and
Qi (0, Hi )> 0, which imply that the commodity can be produced with the natural conditions
(e.g., organic agriculture or grazing native grasses), the non-natural input (e.g., fertilizer,
replanting of faster growing feed crops), or some combination of both.3 The social planner
maximizes the present value of commodity profits less the costs of treatment and prevention
of the invasive, while facing constraints about IAS (Eq. 1 for both regions) and habitat stock
(Eq. 2), and beginning from initial conditions for habitat quality and IAS level:
max










πi (t) − (t)
}
dt (5)
where r is the discount rate. We leave for future research the question on how managing for
other ecosystem service values associated with the habitat effects the choice of IAS controls.
In Table 1, we illustrate the general first order conditions for the control problem. The
variables λi and ϕi are the shadow prices (costates) for the habitat and infestation states in
region i , respectively. Because infestation is a bad, ϕi is negative and is interpreted as the
amount that the SP would be willing to pay on the margin to remove an additional IAS. ϕi
can also be interpreted, therefore, as the value of the damages from a marginal change in
the stock of the IAS. λi is the value associated with a marginal improvement in the habitat.
Although a closed form solution to the system of equations is mathematically intractable at
this level of generality, we derive intuition from the FOCs. First, Eq. 6 states that the value of
the marginal future damages avoided (marginal damages are equal to the marginal reduction
in the IAS transmission multiplied by the present value shadow price of damages in time t)
is equal to the marginal cost of inspection of foreign goods. Equation 7 states the same for
inspections of domestic goods.
Here, commodity production reduces habitat quality but restoration can offset that effect;
the SP finds the optimal level of restoration using Eq. 9. To determine the optimal level of
the commodity production, the SP uses Eqs. 8 and 9, finding the level where the value of the
marginal product of the output is equal to the marginal cost of using the non-habitat input
(second term) plus the marginal damages to the habitat, which are mitigated by the optimal
level of habitat restoration4:
3 We also impose that the marginal product of using the non-natural input is greater than or equal to the
marginal product from the natural habitat (∂ Q/∂ Ai ≥ ∂ Q/∂ Hi ), everything else being equal. In other words,
the non-natural input is more productive per unit at the margin.
4 The equation is derived assuming an interior equilibrium.
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Table 1 Social planner first order conditions in current value terms
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The marginal value of habitat is derived from habitat quality’s impact on commodity pro-
duction, habitat’s regenerative rate, and the value of reducing the ability of the invasive to
invade and establish (Eq. 11).5 The marginal value of the damages from an invasive species
(Eq. 12) is a function of the deterioration of the habitat quality, as mitigated by restoration
efforts, and, through the ecological dispersal process, the level of infestation in the other
region. The term ϕ j (∂ f j/∂xi ) represents the amount the SP is willing to pay to eliminate the
ecological dispersal process to reduce the risk of the IAS from spreading between regions.
3 Numerical Analysis
To explore the behavior of the bioeconomic model and to determine the portfolio of policies
that are optimal in different settings, we solve for the numerical steady-state equilibrium
using Matlab. In order to solve the system, we specify a particular profit function. We assume
that profits are equal to:
πi = pi
(
υi,1 Aαi + υi,2 Hαi
)1/α − wi Ai − ci m2i − γi E2i (14)
where ci is the cost per unit to restore habitat, wi is the cost per unit of input, γi is the cost
to remove the IAS, υi,1 is the conversion factor of a unit of input, and α is the elasticity
of substitution between the agricultural input and habitat. This production function for the
commodity (say, crop or livestock) displays a constant elasticity of substitution between the
two inputs: Ai and the habitat Hi .
With this profit function, the optimal control problem is non-linear (see, for example,
Bryson 1998).6 We utilize the constrained non-linear equation solver KNITRO in Matlab,
5 The particular components on the right hand side of Eq. 13 are the value marginal product, the marginal
ecological production, the marginal reduction in the transmission of IAS into region i, and the reduction in
the reproductive rate of the IAS.
6 We leave the characterization of the transitional dynamics for future research. See Bryson (1988) for more
description of the methods for solving multi-dimensional optimal control problems.
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which permits us to consider optimal interior steady-state solutions (all controls are positive)
and optimal boundary solutions (some or all controls are set to zero). A table of parameter
symbols, definitions, and levels that are used in the simulations appears in the supplementary
material.
Although the model is set-up to permit foreign trade into both regions, to emphasize the
spatial heterogeneity across regions and to limit the number of cases presented, we focus here
on the scenario where one region (region 1) interacts with economic forces exogenous to the
model (in other words has foreign trade), while the other region captures a region without
foreign trade (region 2). Without loss of generality, we denote this scenario port-inland.
In our numerical analysis, we focus on two questions. First, we compare the results from
the fully connected model to those from a no-linkage model (no trade or ecological dispersal)
to highlight how IAS pathways contribute to spatially differentiated patterns of control. We
also introduce each linkage independently to illustrate how adding in the linkage alters the
control strategies.
Second, we compare predictions when the planner has all of the controls available to a
situation where certain controls are not available. For example, the planner can engage in
removal and restoration but inspections are not considered, even though IAS populations are
transmitted through trade. We are, therefore, able to investigate how our more general set-up
yields potentially different policy conclusions from analyses that do not consider all of the
controls in one framework.
With the large number of parameters in the model, we choose our base set of parameters
to minimize the potential differences in our results due to the levels rather than processes.
For example, we assume that both the per unit cost of domestic (θs) and foreign inspections
(θv ) and the contribution to IAS growth from these transmission sources (β1,i = β2,i ) are
equal. The difference in the results between these cases, therefore, is driven by how these
transmission pathways enter the model. We also assume that the cost of removal efforts
(e.g., herbicide, pesticide application) is less than the costs of habitat restoration (e.g., plant-
ing native species, plowing fields). The online supplementary material provides additional
explanation for the choices of parameters and the full set used in the base case.
3.1 Implications of Multiple IAS Dispersal Pathways
We begin by assuming that the regions are homogeneous ecologically and economically,
except for the port-inland structure. In this analysis, our results focus on percentage differ-
ences between the steady-state level with open transmission pathways and the level with
no linkages (Table 2). A positive (negative) level indicates that the level is higher (lower)
by that percentage in the open transmission pathways case. The no-linkage equilibrium is
characterized by levels of the IAS at approximately 68% of its carrying capacity and habitat
quality level equal to 52% pristine habitat, with 22% of the total costs spent on removal
activities and 78% spent on restoration. The levels of controls and the states are equal across
the regions, because the port-inland structure is not relevant in the case without trade and
ecological linkages.
Introducing an ecological dispersal pathway increases the IAS population by 10% in each
patch. This increase is due in part to ecological dispersal increasing the overall growth rate
of the invasive species and the planner choosing to implement lower levels of removal activ-
ities (decrease of 11.5 %). At the same time, the planner chooses slightly more restoration
(0.75%), higher input use (0.18%), and lower production (−0.2%). Therefore, while the
invasive population increases 10%, output from the regions changes little.
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The result with domestic trade pathways (without ecological dispersal) is similar to the
case with just ecological dispersal, with a slightly lower impact on the invasive population
level. To see why the changes are similar but lower in this case, we focus on the portion of
the growth term in Eq. 1 for region i that captures ecological dispersal and domestic trade,
[bi+βiG(Si, Isi)]xj. Unlike ecological dispersal that cannot be controlled directly, inspections
work against trade’s tendency to increase the IAS population, leading to reductions in the
net growth rate of the invasive (∂G/∂Isi < 0). We find that inspections reduce the standing
stock of invasive population (an increase of only 8.5% relative to a 10% increase in the case
of ecological dispersal). The inspections lead to a lower increase in the IAS population, even
though domestic trade inspection accounts for less than 1% of the costs spent on invasive
management. Removal and restoration still account for around 22% and 77% of the control
costs, respectively.
Introducing foreign trade pathways (without domestic trade and without ecological dis-
persal) leads to a larger increase in the port region’s invasive population than seen in the cases
with just domestic trade or just ecological dispersal. Inspections can significantly reduce the
level of incoming IAS but the level cannot be driven to zero (Vi = 0, see above). Output in
the port region is lower overall but is higher than inland due to greater use of the non-habitat
input and the higher restoration efforts.
Layering the domestic trade pathways onto the case with foreign trade creates non-linear
interactions across the pathways. We see, for example, a 9.35% increase in the inland region’s
invasive population instead of an 8.57% increase with just domestic trade, as compared to the
no-linkages case. Similarly, we see a much larger increase in the invasive population in the
port region than with either foreign or domestic trade alone (Table 1) because the IAS in the
port region now comes from two rather than one sources. Interestingly, the greater increase
in invasive in the port region translates into higher increases in the inland invasive population
than in the case with just domestic pathways (9.3– 8.6%). Our model, therefore, is capturing
the potential ripple effect throughout a system due to introductions from outside an area.
Layering another source of the invasive for each region by permitting ecological dispersal
in addition to both trade pathways leads to the largest increase in the invasive population
(density levels in the port are 84% and inland are 80%). Removal efforts also see signifi-
cant disinvestment as the returns to removal are lower with higher invasive population size
(smaller overall reduction per dollar invested in removal). Restoration efforts, however, are
higher to offset the increase in damages to the habitat. The restoration efforts are not enough,
however, to mitigate all of the damages from the invasive, as evident by the decrease in the
level of the habitat quality (down from 51–50% between the case with ecological dispersal
only to the case with all linkages).
Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of removal, restoration, and domestic inspection costs
across the system. Because in the ecological and domestic pathways cases there is no differ-
ence in the stock and control levels across the system, we find that costs are shared equally
across the port and inland region. The allocation of control efforts do change with the intro-
duction of the foreign trade, where we see that more removal efforts are targeted in the inland
region. Overall, the distribution of restoration activities changes very little, with a very slight
increase in the port activity due to foreign trade.
Relative to the case with just one transmission pathway, we find that with both domestic
and foreign trade, the planner shifts towards inspecting the goods arriving inland and away
from inspecting goods arriving into the port. This redistribution of inspection effort is evident
in the distribution of the cost shares in Fig. 1. When all linkages are present, the ecological
dispersal increases the inland region’s IAS population, which causes some of the domestic
inspection efforts to shift back to inspecting the imports from the inland region into the port.
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Fig. 1 Distribution of control costs across the port and inland regions. Note: Restoration is changing across
the cases but the magnitude is less than 1%
What are the potential interactions of spatial heterogeneity in costs and the spatial link-
ages? To address this question, we employ a representative sample of parameter ranges with a
focus on relative differences between spatially specific and general economic and ecological
parameters. In particular, we illustrate the results for a range of differences in the costs of
the non-habitat input (wi ), in the costs of removal (γi ) and in the restoration costs (ci ).
The ratio of the cost parameter in region 2 (inland) to the cost parameter in region 1
(w2/w1,γ2/γ1 or c2/c1) demonstrates the differences between regions with no economic
or ecological linkages in the system (Fig. 2). To isolate these parameter differences, all of
the other parameters are equal across the two regions, which contain the homogeneous case
when the ratio is equal to one (and the levels are equal for each of the three cases). To create
Fig. 2’s depiction of the impact of the relative cost parameters on the invasive population,
habitat, input use, removal, and restoration activities in region 2, we vary w2 holding w1
constant (with no changes occurring in region 1, the port).
As w2 decreases (w2/w1 < 1), the level of the input use increases, because per unit costs
decrease. The greater use of the input leads to higher levels of damage to the habitat that in
turn allow greater levels of the invasive population. The planner responds to the lower habitat
quality and higher invasive population by increasing both restoration and removal activities.
Restoration, however, increases at a much faster rate than removal activities due to restora-
tion being able to negate directly the damages from both the higher invasive population and
greater use of the non-habitat input.
Not surprisingly, lower costs of removing the invasive species (γ2/γ1 < 1) leads to higher
levels of removal activities and to lower invasive population levels. What is surprising, how-
ever, is the small effect that removal costs have on restoration, input, and habitat levels.
A similar result holds for restoration costs, which do not have a significant effect outside
of the obvious inverse relationship between costs and activity levels. In fact, non-habitat
input costs affect the level of restoration activities more than restoration costs. This response
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Fig. 2 Sensitivity analysis on the relative costs of the input (wi), restoring the habitat (ci), and removing the
invasive (γi) with no economic or ecological linkages
derives from the large increase in the non-habitat input and the corresponding damages to
the habitat, where restoration activities offset the greater level of damages.
Building on the intuition from the case with no linkages, we investigate how the distri-
bution of inspection, removal, and restoration costs are affected by spatial heterogeneity,
meaning the differences in regional costs, in the presence of all pathways. (The change in the
levels of the controls and states are provided in supplementary material.) First, for removal
costs (γ ) at low ratios, γ2/γ1 << 1, the SP spends less on inspecting goods moving from
the inland (region 2) to the port region (panel a in Fig. 3) and spends a lower share of inspec-
tion costs on inspecting foreign shipments than at high cost ratios (panel b in Fig. 3). The
regional difference in costs, however, has a very small effect on the distribution of spending
on restoration (panel d in Fig. 3).
These results stem from the size of the IAS population (see supplementary material).
Relative to the case when γ2/γ1 = 1, with low inland removal cost ratios (γ2/γ1 < 1) both
regions have low IAS populations, particularly the inland region. The low invasive population
levels imply lead to less of a need to spend additional resources inspecting goods moving to
the port from the inland region. At the same time, the SP attempts to maintain lower invasive
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Fig. 3 Sensitivity analysis on the share of control costs. Note: Panel a illustrates the share of domestic inspec-
tions spent in the port region. Panel b represents the share of inspection costs spent on foreign inspections.
Panel c illustrates the share of removal costs spent in port region and panel d the share of restoration costs
spent in the port region
stocks in the inland region by increasing inspections from the port. Here, the higher domestic
inspection levels in the inland region outweigh the slightly higher foreign inspections at the
port.
Restoration costs generate the opposite effects (Fig. 4). In this case, as the cost of resto-
ration decreases inland, the SP puts more resources into inspecting the shipments from the
inland region, but the overall share is still weighted more to inspecting goods from the port
region (less than 0.5). The cheaper restoration cost leads to greater use of the non-habitat
input, less investment in removal efforts inland (but still a greater share of efforts occur inland
as depicted in Fig. 3 panel c), and increases in the invasive population. The level of foreign
inspections in the port and domestic inspections into the inland region go down, but the rate
of decrease is greater in domestic inspections (see supplementary material). Overall, the SP
cares less about the invasive because the costs of mitigating the damages are lower. The
greater rate of decline of domestic inspections leads to a greater share of the inspection costs
being spent on foreign inspections (panel b Fig. 3).
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Fig. 4 Impacts of restricting the control portfolio. Note: The impacts are measured as deviations off of the
case when all controls are included
Across the different analyses, our findings reveal the introduction of additional pathways
is neither a simple average nor an additive combination of the results with more limited trans-
mission pathways. For example, in Table 1, the additive combination of ecological dispersal,
domestic trade, and foreign trade for the invasive population in the port region would be a
29.5% change for the case with no linkages. The model with all of the linkages results in
only a 24% change from the same base case. In our analysis, therefore, there are synergies in
the control decisions when all the transmission pathways are incorporated that result in the
smaller increase in IAS population. These synergies would not be part of the solution set in
models with more limited transmission pathways. Similarly, we find that control strategies
in the presence of spatially linked processes (IAS transmission) interact in a non-linear way
with the degree of spatial heterogeneity.
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3.2 Implications of Limited Control Options
We now ask the question: how different are the model predictions when we restrict the control
options available to the social planner? In particular, we are interested in the changes to the
invasive and habitat stock and in the level of the controls that are permitted. Our analysis will,
therefore, shed light on whether previous IAS modeling efforts that only consider removal
efforts (and are second-best in our setting) give markedly different policy guidance than
models that include restoration and/or trade inspections as well.
Before running the numerical examples, the first order conditions provide intuition on the
likely impact of restricting the control set. With restoration, the planner equates the marginal
return from investing in restoration to the user cost of the habitat (Eqs. 9 and 11). The lat-
ter is a function of the economic value of habitat in production (pi (∂Qi/∂ Hi )), the cost of
utilizing the habitat (1/(ri + ∂gi/∂ Hi )), and the damage from of the invasive alien species
(φi (∂ fi/∂ Hi )). Without restoration as a policy option, the planner adjusts the level of the
non-habitat input directly to account for the user cost of the habitat (Eq. 13 is modified as Eq.
11 is used to solve for the shadow price rather than Eq. 9), but cannot mitigate the damage.
We should expect, therefore, to see a decrease in the level of non-habitat input relative to
the case when restoration is available. Whether this change, however, affects the level of
production on the land depends also on the changes to habitat quality.
As above, we begin by assuming that the only heterogeneity in the system is due to the
port-inland structure. The cases we consider are: no domestic inspections, no foreign inspec-
tions, no trade inspections, no restoration, and no trade and restoration. In all cases, the SP
still has the ability to adjust output and removal efforts. Figure 4 illustrates for each region the
percent difference between the cases and the level when all controls are available (removal,
restoration, and inspections).
Under the current assumptions, models that do not consider inspections predict high
invasive populations and slightly lower levels of habitat quality. These models also provide
policy guidance that leads to substantial reductions in the optimal amount of removal activ-
ities. Across the regions, patterns are qualitatively identical with slightly lower percentage
deviations in the inland region. Overall, the optimal use of the land (use of non-habitat input
and output levels) are only slightly off the mark. Interpreted differently, a manager who can-
not perform inspections does not make very different land use decisions than those that can
but the landscape looks different in terms of invasive populations and habitat quality when
the manager is constrained from using inspections.
On the other hand, an IAS model (or a constrained manager) that does not include res-
toration as part of the portfolio of control options results in a significant over emphasis on
removal activities and a severe deviation from the optimal use of the land. For example, the
reduction in output compared to the full set of control options is on the order of 40% in both
regions. The reduction in output is optimal under the restrictive control set, but reveals the
cost of not having that policy option and the potential level of error made by models that
do not incorporate restoration as an option. Figure 4 also illustrates the non-linear cumula-
tive effects of not including restoration and trade on the invasive populations and removal
efforts. Although the predictions on the direction of the deviations differ in the invasive and
removal efforts, the significant reduction in output is consistent across the two cases that
omit restoration activities as a policy tool.
Does spatial heterogeneity exacerbate or mitigate the potential costs of second-best pol-
icies? To answer this question, we undertake a sensitivity analysis for the no trade, no res-
toration, and no trade and restoration cases (Fig. 5). Changing the relative costs of using the
non-habitat input in the inland region has very little effect on the distortions in the port region
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Fig. 5 Sensitivity analysis on the implications of limited control portfolio with respect to changes in the cost
of the non-habitat input. Note: The impacts are measured as deviations off of the case when all controls are
included. For example, a decrease of 0.5 is a 50% decrease in the level from the case when all controls are
permitted
where the level remains virtually unchanged. In the inland region, however, the magnitude
of the distortions is affected, especially the predicted levels of habitat quality, non-habitat
input, and output in the cases when restoration is omitted from the control set.
With w2 << w 1, the potential error associated with factors is on the order of 50%. As
the cost of w2 increases, the magnitudes of errors decrease due to the smaller differences
between the results with the limited portfolio and the first-best solution, which stems from
the low input use in the first best setting when w2 >> w1 (see supplementary figure S1).
With little use of the habitat in the first best setting, the potential effect of reducing the control
set is muted.
The predictions regarding the level of removal efforts and invasive population follow
a different pattern from the production variables. In the case with no trade inspections, the
percent difference between the invasive population with the full set of controls increases with
w2 (and is positive) due to underinvestment in removal efforts. The opposite holds for the
case of no restoration, where the overinvestment in removal efforts to mitigate the damages
to habitat from the invasive species leads to slightly lower levels of the invasive population.
Similar analysis for the costs of restoration (no trade case only) and the costs of removal
are presented in the supplementary material. Overall, the patterns are qualitatively identical
for the case of removal costs. With respect to restoration costs, we find that there is very little
change in the production variables and similar effects on the invasive and removal efforts as
the no trade case in Fig. 5.
123
534 J. N. Sanchirico et al.
4 Discussion
Invasive alien species (IAS) are a natural resource management problem that has multiple
points of control across space. We develop a unique 2-region economic-ecological model
that captures simultaneously the role of introductions from inside (domestic and ecological
dispersal) and outside (foreign trade) the system on IAS populations, and the role of several
control options—inspections, restoration, and removal efforts—to mitigate IAS damages.
Incorporating all of these pieces allows us to see trade-offs among controls and across space
and identify the implications of not including the full portfolio of management options in
models of IAS control.
As individual transmission pathways, foreign trade’s impact on controls and on IAS pop-
ulations appears larger than the impact of domestic trade and ecological dispersal pathways.
However, our results demonstrate that when there are multiple pathways for IAS transmis-
sion, control strategies are not simply additive or average combinations of the results with a
limited set of pathways because system-wide interactions are non-linear. These results and
our analysis of reduced sets of control options, signal that policy recommendations from
modeling efforts that only consider one of the dimensions and/or control strategies may be
far from efficient. Similarly, control strategies in the presence of spatially linked processes
interact in a non-linear way with the degree of spatial heterogeneity. IAS control models that
focus on only part of the portfolio of options available to planners can provide incomplete
and often misguided policy advice both in terms of where to target limited resources and
the level of controls to apply. Removing restoration from the control set, for example, leads
to excessive reliance on removal efforts and significant deviations from the optimal use of
the land. Predictions from more limited models are also affected by the spatial heterogeneity
in the system. Overall, our results imply that using spatial characteristics (e.g., existence of
a type of habitat) as the basis for making conservation policy can make erroneous predic-
tions in the presence of spatial processes for which even the direction of error is difficult to
determine.
Some interesting extensions to our model would be to endogenize the level of the trade
between the two domestic regions, to investigate the implications of having two regional
planners that might or might not cooperate, and to consider the case where the regulator is
restricted from applying spatially-explicit control policies. The primary lesson is that focus-
ing on a subset of transmission pathways, on only one or two controls, or on a single region,
misses important interactions that would limit that focused effort’s ability to generate policy
recommendations.
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